nembers of their kin classes (Shapiro 2005a). This, it bears noting, is a sort of datum itively capital theoretical importance, obviating as it does most of the claims of the /led 'new kinship studies,' which, it also bears noting, have more than an accidental :ion to Marxist ideology (Shapiro 2008).

elanesia is plainly not among my areas of ethnographic expertise, so these itions should be taken as an invitation to those more versed in the relevant literature up and settle the matter. It may well be that what is regularly found there is the ng of the nuclear family and the wholesale denigration of women, just as Engels t. In that case all we would need to explain is why this pairing occurs in the absence talism.

y assumption, once again, is that anthropology is an enterprise which brings data to n theories and discards the latter if the two fail to jibe. If it's the former that gets l with, or scotched, something by no means unknown to Marxists and 'radical' sts, this too is allowable, under guarantees of religious freedom most of us enjoy.

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'Becoming Beautiful in the Dance': On the Formation of Ethical Modalities of Being in Yap, Federated States of Micronesia[1]

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ABSTRACT

This article examines how the ideals of self-monitoring, self-reflexivity, self-restraint, and self-governance, as well as assumptions pertaining to the mastery of the body, its movements, and forms of expressivity, lie at the heart of one of Yap's (Federated States of Micronesia) most important aesthetic institutions - the dance. In so doing, it suggests that Yapese dancing and the forms of self-vigilance that are associated with it can be understood as implicated in the formation of a distinctly Yapese moral modality of being. That is, Yapese dancing - including its performance and appreciation - plays a role in helping individuals craft particular forms of feeling, thinking, appreciating, judging, imagining, and behaving that are consonant with local understandings of the good person, the good life, and right action.

Key words: dance, ethical modes of being, cultural phenomenology, Yap

> A polite and agreeable exterior was maintained at all times to reveal nothing of internal mental states. Yapese frequently played games testing each other's abilities to keep their concentration and sense of restraint. Spectators at a Yapese dance who had forgotten themselves and had become enthralled by a particular dancer were singled out and reminded to chew their wad of betel (*mu ko bu'*), much to the delight of all present.
>
> James Egan (1998)

In recent years the anthropology of morality has become an increasingly significant contributor to our understanding of the cultural crafting of ethical modalities of being (see Howell 1997; Zigon 2008). Whether focusing upon the complex dynamics of local moral words (e.g., Garcia forthcoming; Kleinman 1999, 2006), the critical assessment of regimes of power, truth, and oppression (e.g. Asad 1993; Mahmood 2005), the practical ethical implications of ethnographic engagements (e.g., Castañeda 2006; Meskill and Pels 2005), the embodiment of moral ideals (Lester 2005; Rydstrøm 2003), or the relationship between practice, value, and virtue (e.g., Lambek 2008; Mattingly 1998; Parish 1994), this literature has offered much in the way of situating morality within an anthropological frame (cf. D'Andrade 1995; Scheper-Hughes 1995). Indeed, through examining reflective engagements with particular cultural resources (e.g., Shweder et al. 1990), emotional and embodied forms of lived experience (e.g., Geurts 2003; Lutz 1988; Parish 1991), routine participation in everyday activities (e.g., Bourdieu 1977; Briggs 1998; Rydstrøm 2003), and processes of language socialization (e.g., Ochs and Schieffelin 1984; Schieffelin and Ochs 1986), a great deal of insight has now been garnered into how it is that we are afforded particular tendencies to think, perceive, appreciate, judge, imagine, act, and feel in morally appropriate ways (see also Throop 2003a, forthcoming a).

In this paper I would like to contribute to this growing body of literature by exploring how a cultural phenomenological approach to morality can shed further light on the place of the moral and the ethical in what may otherwise be considered strictly aesthetic practices.[2] More specifically, I aim to examine how the ideals of self-monitoring, self-reflexivity, self-restraint, and self-governance, as well as assumptions pertaining to the mastery of the body, its movements, and forms of expressivity, lie at the heart of one of Yap's (Federated States of Micronesia) most important aesthetic institutions - the dance. In so doing, I suggest that Yapese dancing and the forms of self-vigilance that are associated with it can be understood as implicated in the formation of a distinctly Yapese moral modality of being. That is, Yapese dancing - including its performance and appreciation - plays a role in helping individuals craft particular forms of feeling, thinking, appreciating, judging, imagining, and behaving that are consonant with local understandings of the good person, the good life, and right action. Before turning to examine the ethical and aesthetic aspects of Yapese dancing, however, I will first briefly discuss the problem of the formation of moral modalities of being from a cultural phenomenological frame.

TOWARD A CULTURAL PHENOMENOLOGY OF MORALITY

A cultural phenomenological approach to morality is rooted in the basic phenomenologically grounded insight that perception, as Thomas Csordas argues, does not begin, but rather, 'ends in objects' (1990: 9; 1994). That is, social actors are never simply passively registering a pre-determined world of experience. They are instead actively engaged (although often in unrecognized ways) in the constitution of the personal, interpersonal, and cultural worlds within which they find themselves enmeshed. Accordingly, there are numerous perceptual, existential, and embodied processes that underlie the constitution of experience as lived by any given individual.

As Husserl taught, in the dynamic flux of subjective life social actors are continuously shifting their attention to differing aspects of their lived experience. For instance, at one moment my attention might be focused upon imagined plans for the coming weekend. At the next, I may turn to recalling a conversation I had with a colleague about an important departmental meeting early Monday morning. At that moment my attention may shift yet again to examining the perceptual details of an email message on my computer in order to see how much the cancellation fee for my previously booked hotel room will end up costing me.

In addition to altering their modes of attention to differing aspects of experience whether imagined, recollected, or perceived, Husserl further argued that individuals are able to shift between differing 'attitudes' - from a 'natural attitude' to a 'theoretical attitude' for instance - by engaging in what he termed acts of phenomenological modification (Husserl 1962; see also Duranti n.d. a and b; Throop 2008a, forthcoming a and b).[3] For instance, an individual may at times participate in engagements with other social actors as 'beings-like-me' - as meaning endowing, feeling, knowing, and willing subjects who may experience suffering and joy (see also Husserl 1993; Stein 1989; Throop 2008b). Alternatively, the same individual may modify his/her attention to those self-same others by orienting to them as objects, as physical entities, as corporeal bodies that have been divested of such subjective entailments (cf. Good 1994).

Turning from the experience of other social actors to that of the natural world, Husserl understood that the view of a meaningless, inert, objectively given nature set apart from the subjectivities that perceive it, is itself a concept that is constituted in a given lifeworld, a lifeworld that has a historical specificity and which is also the result of particular acts of phenomenological modification (Husserl 1970). That attitude in which we are immersed in a taken-for-granted orientation to the physical world as something that exists apart from our perception of it, he termed the natural attitude. Implicated in Husserl's account of the

natural attitude is the idea that it, like other attitudes, is constituted subjectively not only in terms of particular ways of seeing, feeling, and acting, but also in terms of particular ways of judging and appreciating (cf. Geertz 1973; Throop forthcoming b).

There have been diverse attempts within phenomenologically oriented anthropology to examine how insights such as these articulate with cultural processes. I have undertaken a more detailed examination of this literature elsewhere (see Throop 2003b, 2005, 2008a; Throop forthcoming a; see also Duranti n.d. a and b). One particularly generative contribution, however, is found in Thomas Csordas' notion of 'somatic modes of attention.' Drawing on Schutz' (1970) and Merleau-Ponty's (1999) phenomenological insights, Csordas defines somatic modes of attention as those 'culturally elaborated ways of attending to and with one's body in surroundings that include the embodied presence of others' (1993: 138). By grounding attention directly in the existential structure of our bodily ways of being-in-the-world, Csordas wishes to highlight the various ways that culture can serve to pattern one's attention to bodily sensations in relation to perception, sociality, and motility. As he explains, to

> attend to a bodily sensation is not to attend to the body as an isolated object, but to attend to the body's situation in the world....Attention *to* a bodily sensation can thus become a mode of attending to the intersubjective milieu that gives rise to that sensation. Thus, one is paying attention *with* one's body (1993: 138).

And it is, he holds, in the organization of attention in relation to the body that experience becomes patterned according to both 'pre-objective' and 'objective' modalities (see Throop 2005).

Csordas' insights, along with others (see Berger 1997, 1999; Berger and Del Negro 2002; Leder 1990; Levy 1973, 1984), lend support to what I have termed elsewhere an attentional-synthetic approach to the cultural patterning of sensation and feeling (Throop 2008a; see also Throop forthcoming a). Such an approach pivots on differences found in specific cultures tied to the functioning of attention and memory. To borrow William James's (1890) apt terminology, it is *collectively structured forms of selective attention* to the various sensory, affective, conative, and cognitive dimensions of subjective life that accounts for observed differences in the articulation of experience in differing cultures or communities.

Of particular significance for extending such insights to the realm of the moral and the ethical is a recent work by Kathryn Linn Geurts (2002) that examines the cultivation of moral sensibilities amongst Anlo speaking peoples in southeastern Ghana. Drawing specifically from Csordas' (1990: 9) contention that 'the goal of a phenomenological anthropology of perception is to capture that moment of transcendence in which perception begins, and, in the midst of arbitrariness and indeterminacy, constitutes and is constituted by culture,' Geurts argues that the process of learning to appropriately focus and isolate elements of fluctuating bodily sensations in culturally appropriate ways is a mode of organizing experience that may be implicated in 'ways of understanding and expressing morality' (2002: 74). In particular she looks to kinesthetic sensations of balance, motility, and movement as key domains for effectively realizing Anlo ideals concerning morality and virtue.

Geurts suggests that moral sensibilities are thus significantly tied to our routine ways of attending to bodily sensations and through those sensations to the social and physical worlds within which we find ourselves emplaced. That is, moral values can be understood as residues of *collectively structured modes of selective attention*. Borrowing from the language of Michel Foucault (1985, 2005), we can thus say that the organization of attention as mediated through our sensorium can be directly affected by differing hermeneutics and technologies of self. That is, the cultural organization of attention is often

implicated in the ethical work 'that one performs on oneself, not only in order to bring one's conduct into compliance with a given rule, but to attempt to transform oneself into the ethical subject of one's behavior' (Foucault 1985: 27; cf. Robbins 2004).

Such possibilities for self-transformation arise not only with the habitual instillation of practical embodied dispositions and sensory attunements, however, but also in moments where one's taken-for-granted mode of being-in-the world, one's 'natural attitude' as Husserl termed it, is challenged (see Throop forthcoming a). The shift that occurs in one's self-understanding in the face of such a destabilization gives rise to possibilities for rearticulating one's orientation to existence through shifting, as Husserl might have said, between different acts of phenomenological modification and through them to differing attitudes toward experience, be those attitudes practical, theoretical, aesthetic, moral, or otherwise (cf. Duranti n.d. a and b; Geertz 1973; Throop forthcoming a and b).

In a recent article, Jarrett Zigon (2007) has explored some comparable insights in detailing the significance of a Heideggerian inspired approach to the problem of morality. Most useful for my purposes in this article is Zigon's attempt to employ Heideggerian philosophy to distinguish between moral and ethical modalities of existence (cf., Kleinman 1999). Where moral modalities of existence are tied to our practical, embodied, and unrecognized ways of being-in-the-world that are familiar to the point of being taken-for-granted as natural, ethical modalities of existence arise in contrast at heightened moments of self-reflection. Following Heidegger (and to a somewhat lesser extent Foucault), Zigon points out that such ethical moments of reflection often occur at points in which our taken-for-granted moral engagements with the world are somehow breached, or in Husserlian terms destabilized (see Throop forthcoming a). It is in the face of such moments of 'moral breakdown,' as Zigon terms it, that possibilities for reassessing, transforming, and then reclaiming aspects of one's previously unnoticed moral engagements with the world become possible.

Significantly, such forms of self-transformation as mediated through various sensory and embodied modalities of being, whether considered as moral or ethical modes of existence in Zigon's formulation, point to the possible intersection of moral, ethical, and aesthetic dimensions of experience. The ways that we are conditioned to move, balance, see, touch, hear, taste, and smell may thus become configured as much by aesthetic cannons as by moral or ethical assumptions (see also Howes 2003). As we will see in the case of Yapese dancing these two 'attitudes' or orientations to experience are necessarily mutually informing.

THE VIRTUE OF SELF-GOVERNANCE

Prior to turning to discuss Yapese dancing *per se*, let me first provide a brief sketch of Yapese understandings of moral modalities of being. Simply put, a virtuous person in Yap is understood to be an individual who is able to sacrifice his or her individual desires, wants, wishes, feelings, opinions, and thoughts to the dictates of the family, village, and community (see Throop 2008a, forthcoming a). The virtues of self-abnegation and self-restraint as realized through careful reflection and deliberation are essential to the cultivation of those qualities that inhere in a virtuous person; a person who acts thoughtfully, with self-control, humility, and concern for others.[4] An individual who is not able to cultivate these qualities, who acts impulsively, who transparently expresses his or her personal feelings and emotions, who speaks without thinking, or acts without regard to the concerns of others, is a person who is thought to have a weak mind, not unlike a child. To wit, the capacity to master the ability to monitor and selectively share one's emotions, feelings, thoughts and opinions in the service of wider familial and community goals is one of the essential psychocultural bases of Yapese conceptions of ethical and moral modalities of being.

Figure 1. Men's Sitting Dance

Significantly, the virtue of self-governance is further closely tied to the valuation of privacy, secrecy, and concealment. Not sharing, not expressing, and not acting upon one's 'true' feelings, opinions, or thoughts - a pattern also widely noted in the context of other Polynesian and Micronesian cultures (Besnier 1994; Mageo 1998; Petersen 1993; Robbins and Rumsey 2008; Wilson 1995) - is indeed one of the core cultural values at the basis of Yapese social life. This understanding of moral modalities of being thus ideally emphasizes a fundamental disconnect between individual expressivity and an individual's inner life. An individual's inner states, defined in terms of personal wants, desires, opinions, feelings, emotions, sensations and thought-objects, are held to have, in many contexts, a non-direct, non-transparent, connection to perceived forms of action and expression. It is instead, purposeful, goal-directed thought that is oriented towards the consequences of one's actions on the thoughts, feelings, and desires of others, be it others living in the village, one's family, or the ancestors that is ideally to guide one's speech, expression, and action. Indeed, an orientation to the consequences of action and a tendency to go to great efforts to conceal personal motives, feelings, and opinions is embedded in one of the central Yapese terms used to refer to an individual's personality - *paqngin* (or *pagniin* in the dictionary's orthography). *Paqngin* encapsulates an emphasis on perceptible effects for, as Jensen (1977a) notes, it refers both to the observable trajectories of an object's 'effects,' 'action,' or 'work' and generally to a person's 'behavior' or 'personality.'

There is, in fact, a number of important ways in which Yapese ethno-epistemologies are oriented, as Shore (1982) similarly claims for Samoa, to an emphasis upon 'effects' and not 'causes.' In this sense, Yapese epistemologies tend to value pragmatic (in the Peircian and Jamesian senses of the term)[5] orientations to social action and personality structure

inasmuch as it is the perceptual effects of an act and not a search for its hidden roots that are often the preferred orientation of social actors in judging or describing the behavior and personalities of others. In line with this tendency to focus on effects, the morally competent adult in Yap is thus seen to be an individual who always thinks (*leam/taafinay*) of the consequences of his or her action and speech before actually engaging in acting or speaking. More often than not, when an individual does speak or act, he or she is also thought to be ideally speaking or acting for another, and not merely for him or herself.

These two culturally patterned inter- and intra-subjective emphases, one focusing upon the merits of engaging in reflective action and the other located in a valuation of privacy, can thus be understood as mutually supportive. The process of evaluating the consequences of one's actions, and thinking carefully before acting, gives rise to an opportunity to monitor carefully what an individual chooses to express to others prior to expressing it. Likewise, it is the ability to gain control over the disclosure of one's emotions and desires through cultivating heightened forms of self-vigilance that is at the basis of enacting effective strategies of concealment, which makes thoughtful deliberate action itself possible. It is, in other words, an individual's ability to think before acting that affords, and is afforded by, those efforts, often motivated by secrecy, at developing self-governance over the expression of personal emotions, opinions, and thoughts.

Well in line with such assumptions, Yapese understandings of subjectivity are importantly configured according to a privileging of mental processes over somatic ones. In fact, the very word for body in Yapese (*doow*) is the same term that is used to designate the detritus resulting from human activity. The body is thus denigrated quite literally as 'trash.'[6] Much like the physical 'trash' that for generations has provided the material for claiming new land from the sea, however, the body can also be transformed into an increasingly purified and ordered (*taqay*) state. Whereas land is locally understood to be ordered and purified through histories of intentional work and productive labor upon it (see Egan 2004; Labby 1976; Throop forthcoming a), the body is purified through being disciplined to serve the ends, intentions, and goals of the socially crafted 'mind' (*yaen'* or *waen'*) - a term that foregrounds the subjective processes of thinking, reflecting, deliberating, perceiving, feeling, and willing, often in opposition to the impulsivity, desires, and needs of the body.

It is the body, then, that is to be mastered, controlled, and disciplined by the mind; a mind that is oriented to cultural virtues highlighting the value of endurance, perseverance, and effortful striving. Whether evidenced in the proliferation of strict ascetic practices in multiple aspects of Yapese life, the rhetoric of constant deferral of personal desires, wants, and needs in the light of obligations to one's family and community, or in terms of the general orientation to work, effort, suffering, and endurance as core cultural virtues, a salient cultural trope in Yap consists of viewing an individual's physical self as ideally subordinated to a mentally governed moral self (see Throop 2008a, 2008b, forthcoming a).

YAPESE DANCE AS A LESSON IN SELF-GOVERNANCE

From Politics to Sentiment

One of the key social arenas within which the virtues of self-governance, privacy, concealment and secrecy are embodied as explicitly accessible aesthetic and moral realities, is in the context of one of Yap's most valued art-forms, the dance (*churuq*). These virtues are equally apparent in the acquisition, performance, and appreciation of dancing. Generally speaking, whether in practice or in reflection upon such practices, individuals often understand the dance to be a privileged site for realizing a range of values central to *yalean* (tradition). As Noritake argues (n.d.), even in the context of preparing dances for Yap Day - an annual state holiday that is held to recognize and celebrate the customs and traditions of Yap State's various peoples - 'what the people think about for much of the preparations for the dance was not the event itself but the correctness of the process of the dance, the orders of the chiefs, and the relations between villages.'

As a number of students of Yapese culture have observed, dancing plays a pivotal role in many aspects of Yapese social, ritual, religious, political, and economic life (Brooks 1988; Egan 1998; Konishi 1999; Müller 1917; Noritake n.d.). The chants and movements associated with different dances are recognized as authored by specific individuals who are able to exchange their dances with other estates, much like other Yapese valuables. The most prestigious dances are those that, either through their original authoring or through their exchange, have become associated with high-ranking house foundations (*daaf*). These high-ranking dances are considered to be *machaaf ko piiluung* (valuables of the chiefs) (Egan 1998: 178). Dances are often exchanged between estates located in different villages. Such histories of transaction are recalled and recognized every time a dance is performed in public. Dances that are acquired in this way are performed publicly only after the representatives of the estate where the dance was first composed are presented with shell money (*yaar*) by the individuals presently authorized to perform it.

In the context of traditional Yapese ceremonial exchanges (*mitmiit*), different types of dances were performed depending on the occasion of the exchange. While there was variation in the organization of *mitmiit* that depended on the reason behind the gathering (e.g. in honor of a deceased *piiluung* vs. reciprocating for hosting a previous exchange), most inter-village *mitmiit* were structured in such a way that they began with a form of dance called *tayoer*. Traditionally this dance was performed by one senior woman from one of the high-ranking estates (*tabinaew*) in the village. The word *tayoer* is made up of the morpheme *yoer*, which means literally 'to cry,' and the prefix *ta-*, which is used to indicate habitual or dispositional forms of activity. Quite literally then, the term can be translated as 'a person who always cries' or 'a person who is predisposed to cry.'

The dance itself consists of a woman performing a chant that explains the relationship between the estate and the other estates that have come to the exchange. As one particularly knowledgeable elder made clear to me, a *tayoer* explains the existing and traditional relationships between the two villages—*ma weeliy marungaqagean ea thaaq nge yalean roorow*. Part of the explanation advanced in the context of a *tayoer* includes those items that were given and not given as forms of help and support in past years. As such, it is largely a directive spelling out of the context within which the present exchange is about to occur. In other words, a *tayoer* details the history of the ongoing relationship between the two villages. Past generosity, support, and gifts are honored. While wrongs, slights and mistakes are highlighted. The *tayoer* is thus seldom an unproblematic affair. Instead, as this elder maintained, everything about the recounting of the *thaaq* is open to contestation, including reference to times when there were disagreements, arguments, social transgressions, or failures to supply aid in times of need.

As the *tayoer* is being performed, the elders of the various estates and the chiefs (*piiluung*) of both villages listen attentively in order to evaluate the accuracy of events depicted in the chant. If all of the parties agree on the content of the *tayoer* then the ceremony may proceed to subsequent stages in which valuables are exchanged as compensation for whatever wrongdoings or debts were enumerated therein (*be matooyil fanra riyuul fa daanga, fanra riyuul kab ea yaer*). However, if there is something included in the *tayoer* that the elders do not agree with this necessitates both sides sitting down to discuss (*puruuy*) the perceived discrepancy. If both sides decide that there was indeed a misrepresentation of the history of relations between the two villages (*thaaq*) they then work together to alter the content of the *tayoer* and request that the newly corrected version be performed. As an elder noted, this is perhaps one of the reasons why these events were traditionally called *mitmiit* (literally, getting stuck again and again) since people were continually trying to work out the details of their mutual understanding of the relationship.

Once the relationship between the villages has been explained, and in some cases

discussed and deliberated over in the context of the *tayoer*, there is then usually the performance of a second dance known as *taamaen* - the same term that is used to negatively describe an individual who asks for food from people other than his or her own family. In contrast to *tayoer*, which is performed by one of the elder women (*puweelwol or pilabthir*) of the village, the *taamaen* is performed by young women (*rogood*). The chant of the *taamaen* is a request for help for the village in the form of specific food items, goods, and valuables. As Egan (1998) points out, it is said that spies were sent to listen to dance practices well in advance of the *mitmiit* to ensure that the gift-giving village would be able to amass the goods that were being requested. Spies were also sent to listen to the *tayoer* so that they could prepare arguments in advance to challenge any version of the history or current status of the *thaaq* that they did not agree with.

Figure 2. Women's Standing Dance

By participating in a *mitmiit* and supplying the goods requested, the giving village was able to provide care and help (*ayuw*) to the village putting on the *tayoer*. As one elder explained, however, if there was no pre-existing connection or relationship (*thaaq*) between the two villages then there could not be *taamaen*. Moreover, the reciprocal nature of *mitmiit* necessitated that *taamaen* could only occur between villages that were of relatively similar or equivalent rank, since it would be extremely humiliating for a highly-ranked village to request help or aid from a village representing the lower strata of Yapese socio-political life.

After the performance of *taamaen* comes the ceremonial exchange of goods. This is then followed by other, more celebratory, dances that could include women's sitting dances (*paer nga buul*), men's standing (*saak'iy*) and sitting dances, or bamboo dances (*gamaal*) (see below). These dances, associated with the *maruuruwol* (celebration), are dances that

speak of historical events, stories, or in some cases are unintelligible because the words of the songs are thought to have been given by ghosts (*kaan*). According to the views of one of my teachers, these dances help to make people feel *falfalaen* (content or happy) after the often-tense deliberations preceding the exchange were completed.

Notice the structure here. First there is deliberation, thinking, and planning in the form of practicing and creating the *tayoer* and the *taamaen*. During the performance of these dances comes the emergence of sentiment. In this case, the key moral sentiments of 'care' (*ayuw*) or 'compassion' (*runguy*) are stirred by the perception of 'endurance' (*athamagil*) 'suffering' (*gaafgow*) and 'humility' (*sobuut*) expressed in the dances. Once these two dances have been given, the dances associated with the ensuing celebration help to evoke feelings of 'happiness' or 'contentment' (*falfalaen*). This, as one of my teachers made clear, was meant to ensure that everyone realize that *Kam gaafgow, kug gaafgow* (You are suffering, I am suffering). Moreover, it was to suggest to all the participants involved that after all of the negotiations it was time to try to move past any residual feelings of 'anger' (*damuumuw*) or 'sadness (*kirbaen'*). These dances were thus held to help participants forget past wrongs and problems and move on with the relationship that they had established together.

In reflecting processes that entail negotiation, respect, care, endurance, humility, and service between individuals, estates, villages, and communities, Yapese dance can thus be understood as a collaboratively realised accretion of activity that entails, and is entailed by, those relations constitutive of the island's broader socio-political structure. The virtues affording, and afforded by, such relations are further at the heart of those aesthetic, moral, and practical standards employed in teaching, enacting, and evaluating the dance.

FORMS OF THE DANCE

Yapese dances consist of three types that are each separately performed by men and by women. These basic forms of dancing include standing (*saak'iy*), sitting (*paer nga buul*), and bamboo (*gamel'*) dances (see Brooks 1998; Iwata 1987; Konishi 1999; Noritake n.d.). All of these dances are traditionally performed on a Yapese dance ground (*malaal*), which is most often located in the center of a village in close proximity to a community house (*p'eebay*). Traditional relations between villages are in fact concretely manifest in the regulations concerning which villages can present which dances on which specific *maalal*. Such regulations further mandate the occasions on which each of the dances may be performed.

Both standing and sitting dances are arranged such that the participants position themselves in a straight line facing in the same direction toward a group of spectators.[7] Dancers are normally arranged such that the tallest individuals are positioned near the center of the line with the shortest (often children as young as three or four years old) on each end. The individual positioned at the center of the line is known as *feek churuq* (get the dance.) He or she is responsible for letting out the first call to initiate the performance. Behind the dancers is located an individual, *koel churuq* ('hold the dance' or 'catch the dance'), who is responsible for singing the majority of the chant that accompanies the dance movements. In some dances, the *koel churuq* is the person who is solely responsible for singing. In others, the dancers sing together as a chorus of call and response at various points throughout the performance. Aside from the singing of the chant that accompanies the dance, the only other instruments employed are a variety of different clapping sounds produced by dancers by hitting their hands together or alternatively against various parts of their bodies (e.g., thighs, upper arm, forearm, etc.).

The movements associated with sitting dances are largely restricted to the head, face, arms and torso, although, occasionally individuals' legs may be extended as a part of the dance. In men's sitting dances, the individual dancers often sit with their knees bent and

their weight resting on their calves. With women's sitting dances, individuals are most often seated in a lotus-like position, their legs crossed with the left foot adjacent to, or directly resting on, the right thigh, and the right foot adjacent to, or directly resting on, the left thigh. This positioning of the legs is not directly perceptible to an observer, however, since a dancer's grass skirt (*oeng*) completely covers her legs and feet. In standing dances, individuals incorporate leg movements to help pivot the body in particular directions. And certain provocative men's standing dances also entail rather exaggerated hip movements.

In contrast to the standing and sitting dances, the bamboo dances (*gamel'*) may be performed by a mixed-group, although the male and female participants are most often children or adolescents. Bamboo dances differ from the other varieties of dance with the dancers forming two parallel lines facing one another and not the audience. Additionally, bamboo dances are very active affairs with individual dancers moving briskly in order to partner up with differing dancers in ever-shifting configurations, all the while singing and producing syncopated rhythms by hitting together bamboo sticks which are each about a meter in length.

Figure 3. Bamboo Dance (*Gamel'*)

The fact that *gamel'* stands in such sharp contrast to the less active standing and sitting dances can perhaps be tied to Wilhelm Müller's early observation that this form of dance was traditionally practiced as a 'war dance.' According to Müller,

> For the war dance (*gamel*) the men do not sing, but rather two immature young girls...who have stationed themselves outside of the "battlefield" on an elevated stone in the center behind the front. The two "war parties" approach from different directions. They are armed with bamboo sticks about a meter long, which serve not only as weapons but as sounding sticks. The armies, arranged in four ranks, gradually move in on one another with highly artistic twisting movements, while they rhythmically beat the bamboo sticks together. (1917: 444)

Two elders who were known for their skill at teaching, performing, and composing dances, claimed that the current practice of *gamel'* was a relatively recent creation stemming from colonial German times (1899-1914) when inter-village warfare was banned. They suggested to me that the current form of *gamel'* was adapted as a way to enable the maintenance of a working knowledge of the fighting techniques employed in battle by covertly incorporating them into the movements of the dance. While it is hard to say to what extent this particular interpretation is historically accurate, it is clear from the individuals I spoke to, and from Müller's characterization, that *gamel'* is seen as differing from the other forms of Yapese dance primarily due to its association with warfare. In contrast to *gamel'*, less active sitting and standing dances are primarily associated with celebrations, exchanges, and funerals.

STAGES OF THE DANCE

A Yapese dance performance is perhaps best understood as a perceptible accretion of a process that proceeds through a number of stages through time.[8] The first of these stages is associated with the moment that a dance is initially performed by elders in the community who still recall the appropriate chant and movements. This first stage is called *pilig ea churuq* (taking down the dance). The second stage, *fool ea churuq* or 'learning the dance,' refers to a period of practice during which the dancers are instructed by the elders in the dance's particular movements, as well as in the melody and words of the chant that accompany it. This stage is not open to the public, especially not to members of the opposite sex. *Wup churuq*, the third stage, consists of determining the order and positioning of different dancers in terms of their arrangement in the line.

Once the instructors have determined that the dancers have become sufficiently skilled in performing the dance, the fourth stage, *taan ea churuq* (under the dance) is entered. During this stage the dance is performed for the first time in front of an audience consisting of members of the opposite sex; most often consisting of those close relatives who on the day of the dance's ceremonial performance will help to dress the dancers and to decoratively cover their bodies in coconut oil and turmeric. The fifth stage, *thum buw*, is another public performance, this time in front of members of neighboring villages who come bearing offerings of betel nut for the dancer and chiefs (*piiluung*) of the host village.

Following this stage comes the main performance, known as the *guywol*. This performance occurs most often in the context of a ceremonial exchange (*mitmiit*) held to celebrate the completion of a community work project (such as the building of a community house) or for memorial or funeral services for high-ranking individuals in the community. In contemporary Yap, such contexts also importantly include some Roman Catholic Church services and the celebration of Yap Day, a State holiday that is set aside to celebrate Yapese culture and tradition. The final stage, *moto churuq nga laang* (hanging up the dance) occurs sometime after the *guywol* back at the dancer's host community's village with audience members arriving with gifts (*ggaan archeaq* - bird food) that are distributed among the dancers.

LEARNING THE DETAILS OF THE DANCE

A key component to learning a dance is said to be linked to a person acquiring the 'details of the dance' - *gam'iingiin ea churuq*. *Gam'iingiin ea churuq*, refers primarily to those movements and positions of the body that are entailed in the dance. This includes

information on how to hold one's head, what to express on one's face, where to direct one's gaze, how to breathe, how to move one's chest, how to hold one's torso, and how to position one's hands and legs - all forms of conscious bodily manipulation that seek to eventually instill taken-for-granted embodied, kinesthetic, and sensory modalities of being in the dancer.[9] While all of these components are deemed to be essential to mastering the 'details of the dance,' a key emphasis is placed upon cultivating the appropriate positioning of the head and upper torso, focusing largely upon: *thig awochey* (positioning of the face), *changar* (facial expression), *loelugey* (orientation of the head), and *pagoofan* (breathing).

This focus upon the intricacies involved in moving and positioning the body is further extended to a general understanding of the way in which individuals are best able to acquire the 'details of the dance.' A person who has fully internalized the *gam'iingiin ea churuq* is said to be an individual for whom 'the dance comes to the body' (*Ma yib fa re churuq u doow*). While performing the dance he or she is said to be 'dancing from inside his or her body' (*Nga be churuq u fithik ea doow*). Learning to dance is thus understood quite literally to be a process of incorporation. It is through making the dance a part of the body that the knowledge of a particular dance is said to *ke miit ngaak* (it sticks to him or her). In so doing, it is possible for a given dancer to eventually come to inhabit a practical moral modality of existence in the sense that Zigon (2007) understands it (see above).

And yet, many elders complained that a major problem with today's dancers is that too many of them do not 'feel the dance inside the body' (*Daar ma thaamiy ea churuq u fithik ea doowey*). In this regard, one teacher explained to me that people often say that there is a 'spirit of the dance' (*kaan ko churuq*). In her estimation, the spirit being referred to here is not solely a spiritual presence. It is more accurately a feeling (*thaamiy ko churuq*). For instance, when people say *Kab ea kaan nga* (a spirit came to it) - a statement that is often uttered by audience members in the wake of a very fast or aesthetically pleasing dance performance - reference is not necessarily being made to actual spirits or ghosts, but rather to the 'feeling of the dance' (*thaamiy ko churu*). Such a statement is meant to recognize the fact that all of the dancers have collectively participated in the feeling of the dance and in so doing 'They become one in the dance' (*Yaed be taqareeb naag ea churuq*).

One of the island's most well known dance instructors once told me that an individual would *not* be deemed skilled at dancing (*towrug*) if he or she is thinking about the details of the dance as they are performing it. As she put it, the dance 'is not in your mind, it is your body' (*Gaathii be u taafinay, ka be u doowam*). As she went on to suggest, when people see a particularly bad dancer - an individual who is not graceful, who is stiff, or who is not moving in unison with the others - they will often comment that the individual in question does 'not yet know the dance inside of their bodies' (*Daawriy naang ea churuq u fithik ea dooway*) or that they 'do not yet own the dance in their body' (*Daawriy finay ea churuq u doowya*).

When instructing dancers it is common for people to recognize an individual's mastery of the movements for a particular dance by saying 'He or she has found it in his or her body' (*Ke pirqeg u doow*). The key to acquiring the details of the dance is thus located in an effortful attempt to embody the dance, so much so that the movements become second nature for the dancer. Or as one dancer put it, 'It has become comfortable or habitual inside the body' (*Ke maacham u fithik ea doow*). There is accordingly much emphasis placed on the fact that learning the details of the dance requires individuals to *athamagil* (endure, persevere, and strive) in order to ensure that the dance is able to penetrate, and become a part of, the body.

It was assumed by many of the people that I spoke to that a significant impediment to participating skillfully in the dance arises when an individual relies too heavily upon his or her capacity to 'think' or 'mentally reflect' (*leam or taafinay*) upon what it is that they are doing. As one teacher explained, such a reliance on explicit forms of thought often leads a dancer to think mechanically through the various details of the dance: 'Now I have to move

my arm like this, now I have to move my head like this and look in this direction, and so on.' In contrast, it is by ensuring that the details of the dance became a part of an individual's body that a dancer can be sure that they will not have to think about the dance while they are performing it.

It is only in thoroughly embodying the dance that they will be able to move with skill and grace. In the words of a friend, 'By striving to learn a dance inside the body, it will not ever be forgotten' (*Ma athamagil ea fil ea churuq u fithik ea doow, daawri pagtaliin*). If the dance is thoroughly embodied (*ke yaen ea churuq u doowey*) then it will be appreciated as aesthetically pleasing. In the process, the dancer will be recognized as *towrug* (skilled, beautiful, graceful). If, however, 'the dance goes to the head' (*ke yaen ea churuq u loelgeey*), if the individual 'thinks explicitly about the dance' (*mafinay ea churuq*), it is likely that he or she will become *ufanthiin* (prideful, arrogant, or conceited).[10]

There is an apparent contradiction in the valuing of tacit embodied forms of knowledge over explicit reflective forms of deliberate action, one that does not seem to sit comfortably alongside the discussion above concerning the valuing of mental over somatic modalities of being. At least part of this contradiction can be reconciled, however, when attention is focused on the kinds of mind states that are deemed to be conducive to the enactment of non-virtuous forms of subjectivity.

As I have come to understand it, the connection between dancing, thinking, and arrogance is rooted in the belief that in thinking about the dance, performers are more likely to think about the people who are watching and admiring them. In the process, dancers are likely to shift their attention away from the dance itself and toward their desire to impress their audience. This shift in attention leads dancers to take up a different attitude (in Husserl's sense) toward the dance. In moving from practical immersion in the feeling of dancing toward a concern for how it is that others are evaluating the performance, dancers are no longer oriented to the activity of dancing in the appropriate way. They are no longer engaged in an immersive practical attitude toward dancing but are instead taking up a more distanced reflective orientation to it. In orienting to the act of dancing as mediated through the imagined evaluations of a third-party (i.e. the audience), dancers take on a variety of self-consciousness that removes them from a taken-for-granted immersion in the activity of dancing.

In contrast, if an individual is immersed in the 'feeling of the dance' (*thaamiy ko churuq*) such that the 'feeling stays inside the body' (*thaamiy ma paer u fithik ea dooway*) and the dance is 'habitual or comfortable inside the body' (*ke maacham u fithik ea dooway*), a dancer is better able to become one with the dance and with the other dancers. Indeed, underpinning this emphasis upon the 'feeling of the dance' is an at times implicit assumption that the thinking through of a performance could very well generate an increased individualized sense of self that is distinct from the other dancers.

As one teacher explained, in thinking while dancing individuals are prone to have a running internal dialogue that recurrently focuses their attention on their movements, their bodies, and the ways in which others are appreciating their performance. It is thus in order to avoid orienting attention to the desires of an admired self that calls for the need to mindfully guard against an all too self-conscious performance. The ideal is instead for a dancer to know the dance so well that it becomes automatic, second nature. When immersed in the dance, the experience of the dancer is reduced to pure movement, pure participation. There is ideally no desire-based thinking, no explicit evaluative self-reflection, and thus no arrogance. It is this immersion in the feeling of the dance that is held to allow dancers to become one in the dance - a goal that is perhaps paradoxically thought to be grounded in a mentally mediated form of reflective concentration (*tiaen*').

BECOMING ONE IN THE DANCE

As Konishi (1999: 11) has argued, the concept of *taqreeb* (unity, one, or oneness) is a central value in both Yapese social life and the dance. Simultaneously entailing moral, aesthetic, and practical meanings, *taqreeb* is an ideal that is reflected in the abilities of those dancers who are able to focus their attention exclusively on the dance. In talking to a number of different elders who were recognized experts at dancing, I was made aware of the extent to which a form of concentration (*tiaen'*) is valued as necessary for both learning and performing a dance. It is also deemed to be necessary for a group of performers to achieve *taqreeb*. The value of focused reflective concentration is not only restricted to dancing but is also held to be centrally implicated in working and acting more generally.[11] Concentrating, paying careful attention to what one is doing, focusing on the task at hand or the action one is undertaking, is an important basis for defining and realizing virtuous modalities of being in Yapese communities (see Throop forthcoming a).



Figure 4. Men's Standing Dance

In the context of the dance, such concentration is meant to ensure that a dancer is able to merge effortlessly with the movements of the other dancers. In so doing, he or she is able to approximate the virtue of unity or oneness entailed in the concept of *taqreeb*. It is also concentration on the dance that allows for the stilling of internal dialogue and any accompanying desire to be admired by others while dancing. During a particularly good dance performance it is indeed not uncommon to hear individuals calling out *Taqaab rogon, taqaab rogon* (The same way, the same way) - a statement that attests to the fact that the dancers are moving in unison as one. In accord with Yapese moral sensibilities, there is a significant connection held to exist here between the ability to actuate such a unity and the state of an individual dancer's mind. As Konishi asserts,

> if a dancer is thinking about something else, like attracting the opposite sex, unity will not be realized. *Feal'e taefinaey* ("good in mind"), which is considered to be the most important concept for Yapese, can be understood in this sense. It is said that a person's behavior and mind should desirably be *taqreeb* and that a good dance performer should appear to have a good mind...Thus, *taqreeb* is connected with something like virtue, which is within an individual, but emerges when he or she dances. [sic] (1999: 12)

This close connection between the state of a person's mind and his or her ability to dance is also evidenced in an expression that is used to rebuke or direct another to focus his or her attention exclusively on the task at hand: *Mu taey fanam ii yaan riiy!* This statement can be heard in the context of scolding children to focus more attention on their homework or in the context of extolling one's fellow villagers to focus carefully on whatever community work project they might be engaged in. In the context of dance instruction a very similar phrase is used as a directive to dancers to make a straight and even line: *Mu flaged ea yaan riiy*. The connection between an attentive mind in the context of work and the physical reality of a straight line of dancers is not, I believe, a mere coincidence. The directionality of attention toward its object, what Husserl (1962) terms 'intentionality,' and the linearity of spatially arranged bodies are not only metaphorically associated in Yapese ethno-epistemology, but, are deemed to be mutually engendering. To hold one's place in an ordered arrangement of dancers is predicated upon a dancer having his or her attention directed toward an object without distraction. Similarly, by being arranged in space in such a way that an individual is moving in unison with others also facilitates a dancer's ability to concentrate on the dance to the exclusion of other possible distractions.

SHOWING THE PERSON THROUGH THE DANCE

It was held by many of the knowledgeable individuals with whom I discussed the art of dancing at some length that people are able to discover who a particular dancer is or the type of person they are through observing them dance. A common saying in this regard is 'You can classify who persons are in or through the dance' (*Gab miit ea maang girdiiq ko churuq*). Dancing often reveals the character or personality of the dancer. It is thus through watching a dance that an audience is able to *gaagiyal* (discover, reveal, or determine) a person's true nature (although some individuals suggested that it was not the character of the person that was revealed through dancing but merely their state of mind during the performance.)

The dance itself is also often said to be a person, or perhaps more accurately a spirit (*kaan*). In this way, the dance is said to have the power to 'open' or 'reveal' the minds of the dancers so that the audience is able to see what kind of a person they really are. In the words of one teacher, 'The dance will come and reveal the dancers, what they are doing, whether they are arrogant or helping the dance' (*Ra yib churuq nge gaagiyal nge girdiqën ea churuq maang ga be riin, ufanthiin, fa ayuweeg ea churuq*).

As a case in point, after returning from watching a particularly energetic dance performance a friend of mine commented that one of the young men participating in the dance was particularly 'prideful' or 'arrogant' (*ufanthiin*). When I inquired as to how she could be certain about this, she replied that it was readily apparent in his face. It was clear, she said, that he thought himself to be *towrug* (skilled at the dance). She asserted that truly great dancers, in contrast, do not think of themselves as *towrug* (skilled, graceful). Instead, there is 'no pride or arrogance in their look' (*daariy ufanthin ea changar roek*) and 'their look is good' (*feal' ea saap ngeak*).

An elder that I knew well from one of the northern municipalities who had participated in and taught many dances, suggested that people often expressed their personality and what

they are feeling through the dance. Such a transparent revealing of a dancer's inner life is precisely what audience members are looking for and take careful note of while watching a performance. When I asked this same teacher if it was deemed to be a good thing to perceive the feelings of another through their dancing, he replied that it certainly was not so. In fact, the opposite was true. When I asked him specifically about what makes a dancer *towrug*, he responded that they are the dancers for whom 'it is kind of hard to read his feeling.'

BECOMING BEAUTIFUL THROUGH THE DANCE (*TOWRUG*)

When learning about the dance I was intrigued (and admittedly rather confused) by the idea of *towrug*. Given the extent to which individuals emphasize the fact that the performance of a good dance is one in which the dancers move in unison and are *taqreeb* or one, I did not understand how it was possible to select one individual as standing out from the rest as being either particularly skilled or self-absorbed. In other words, how is it possible to judge one dancer as better or worse than the others when the ideal for judging a good performance is to see each dancer as equally participating in an activity that ideally enables the conveying of a sense of oneness with the other dancers? As I asked more and more people about the concept, I began to appreciate the fact that *towrug*, as already noted above, is significantly tied to a dancer's ability to conceal his or her feelings, thoughts, and mind, from his or her audience.

Generally speaking, the person who is deemed to be *towrug* is said to possess at least two main qualities: (1) *ma koel faalngiin ea churuq* - they follow the strict ascetic rules associated with the dance which traditionally included following strict food restrictions, occasional fasting, and the avoidance of sexual contact; and (2) *ma naang gam'iingiin ea churuq* - they know the details of the dance. The person who has cultivated both of these qualities, who has obeyed and respected the rules associated with the dance, who has observed restrictions in their diet and behavior (which is held to enable them to evoke the right state of mind to participate in the dance), and who has become intimately familiar with all the proper ways to hold and move the body, is a person whose mind is said to have become beautiful in the dance. In the case of a man, it is observed that the person possesses a 'mind that is beautiful or handsome due to the dance' (*pichooqaay ea taafinay roek u dakean ea churuq*). In the case of a woman, 'Her mind is beautiful or pretty due to the dance' (*Be pidooraang ea taafinay roek u dakean ea churuq*).

As one elder observed, whereas in everyday conversation it is often very hard, if not impossible, to know what another person is really thinking or feeling, in the context of the dance it often becomes quite easy (*moem*) to ascertain. Accordingly, audience members are often able to determine while watching a dance whether or not a particular dancer is 'arrogant, high-minded, sad, frustrated, or angry' (*ufanthiin, fa toelaengaen', fa kirbaen', fa malaalngaen', fa damuumuw*). The people who transparently show their feelings, thought, or mind (*ma gaagiyal ea taafinay roek*) through the dance are not, she claimed, *towrug*. The person who is *towrug* is the person who 'does not reveal his or her feelings, thoughts, or mind because his or her inmost subjective experience is immersed in the dance' (*daar ma gaagiyal ea taafinay roek ya ke laen ii yaen' re churuq*). And it is for this reason, she exclaimed, 'Being skilled and graceful is difficult, because there is nothing else that the person should be thinking about, only the dance' (*Towrug ea moqmaaq, ya daakuri be leam naag, kemus ke leam naag marungaqagean fa re churuq*).

The exceptional dancer is an individual who, when performing, does not pay attention to the audience or the people surrounding them. That is, the great dancer has the ability to concentrate only on the dance movements, subordinating thought to the learned responses of the body. As one friend noted, the best dancers are those who do not react even in the event that their names are called by a person sitting immediately in front them. Instead, they

simply remain in position with their concentration focused exclusively on the dance - *ma tiaen'um, ma leam naag marungaqagean fa re churuq*. And indeed, when dancers first enter a dance ground to prepare to begin a dance they enact this focused concentration by working to maintain an expressionless and empty stare, gazing straight ahead, appearing to look right past or through the audience as they get themselves in position. In waiting to begin the dance, dancers are also expected to look to the ground, so as to maintain their focus.

AESTHETIC APPRECIATION (*NGAT*)

There is in fact a dynamic tension that is enacted between the performers and the audience during a dance that is predicated upon the interplay of feeling, attention, concealment, secrecy, and self-governance. In many ways then, the performance of a dance serves as a performative locus for the enactment and evaluation of individuals' abilities to approximate local moral modalities of being. It can be said with Geertz (1973: 449) that a Yapese dance is 'a kind of sentimental education.' For indeed, much like the Balinese cockfight, a dance performance is able to provide, for both dancers and spectators alike, an opportunity to get a sense of what their 'culture's ethos' and their own 'private sensibility (or, anyway, certain aspects of them) look like when spelled out externally in a collective text' (ibid). As we will see below, the interactions between audience members and individual performers engender possibilities for self-transformation through the embodying of moral sensibilities and the evoking of moments of heightened ethical reflection when such sensibilities are destabilized or breached. Dancing is thus not merely implicated in the formation of the *dancers'* moral modes of being. It is also tied to the formation and transformation of the *spectators'* moral sensibilities as well.

As Egan notes in the epigraph at the beginning of this paper, a good deal of attention is paid during a dance performance not only to the abilities of certain dancers to approximate the ideal of concealing their internal states while participating in the dance, but also to the emotional reactions of audience members, who when seeing a particularly beautiful dancer or dance performance may become so absorbed in the dance that they forget to monitor their own expressivity. In fact, at times, individual audience members become so caught up in watching the dance that they begin to mimic the movements of the dancers. When other audience members notice that an individual has become too engrossed in the performance, they will often call out the person's name before shouting *Kew buw!* (Chew betel nut!). This was characterized by the people I spoke to as an attempt to awaken a person to the fact that he or she has become lost in the dance and that they are no longer in possession of themselves. As Egan (1998) has observed, this utterance almost always elicits a great deal of laughter from the other spectators.

The term that is used to describe the subjective state of individuals who are so absorbed in appreciating the dance is *ngat*. The term is defined in Jensen's dictionary as 'engrossed.' It is employed to describe individuals who when watching the dance 'have forgotten everything' because they have given their minds completely over to what another person is doing. When *ngat*, individuals are held to be so completely absorbed in the object they are appreciating that they are no longer able to maintain the distancing self-reflective stance that is so valued in Yapese culture. In this light, *ngat* is held to be a state of mind that arises when an audience member becomes fixated on one dancer or the dance as a whole, and in the process fails to monitor his or her own emotional reactions. Instead of working to conceal their inner states, the audience members become lost in appreciating the movements of the dancers. According to one elder, the reason why other audience members would single out individuals who had become *ngat* by calling out to them to *kew buuw* is precisely in order to 'refresh' their mind, to 'wake them up.'

Calling out for another to chew betel nut can be understood as an attempt to get an

individual back to a conscious, self-reflective, and self-governing stance in which he or she is once again aware of him or herself and what he or she is revealing to others. This form of reflective self-consciousness is not to be confused with the prideful or arrogant forms of self-consciousness that are ideally to be avoided by performers, however. It is reflective self-consciousness in the service of self-governance and the concealment of one's self-experience from the purview of others. It is not a desire-based reflective self-consciousness oriented to seeking out positive evaluations and admiration from others.

In many ways, it seems that this dialectic of entering into an absorptive oneness with the dancers and their movements, and the need to take oneself out of this absorption, is a basic dynamic that demonstrates two intersecting values in Yapese society: unity and self-governance. It is also a movement that pivots on different acts of phenomenological modification in which an audience member shifts from an unrecognized practical immersion in the act of appreciating the performance to a moment of heightened self-reflection when their taken-for-granted absorption in the dance is disrupted by the shouts and calls of other audience members. There is thus a certain amount of ambivalence inherent in the experience of *ngat* as a mental state that implies a complete immersion of consciousness with its intentional object. On the one hand, it is considered a somewhat positive form of appreciating the dance in as much as it evidences a sense of unity or oneness between the dancers and the audience. On the other hand, it is also somewhat devalued as antithetical to the ideal of maintaining self-reflexivity in the midst of focused concentration.

In a dance performance there is thus an ongoing interplay between performers and audience members that is predicated upon a collectively realized calibration of attention that is enmeshed in a dialectical flow of moments of absorptive unity and of distanced self-governance amongst the various participants. All of the individuals involved in the performance (both dancers and audience members alike) are faced with the challenge of maintaining a delicate balance between these two poles. On the one hand, the individuals seek to guard against desire-based forms of self-consciousness, stances that in their more exaggerated forms bring about arrogance and pride. And on the other, there is work to avoid a complete and utter absorption in a given activity that may effectively efface an individual's ability to monitor his or her expressiveness. Accordingly, both dancers and audience members alike are faced with opportunities to engage in an education of their sensibilities and to approximate ideals associated with a number of core cultural virtues through navigating the delicate path between mindful self-reflection and mindful absorption.

To sum up, an audience member is expected to appreciate and evaluate the performance of particular dancers in terms of the dancers' abilities to help the dance achieve a sense of unity, which is based on the dancers' capacities to affect an expressive opaqueness that effectively conceals the content of their subjective states. In appreciating a particularly beautiful dance or dancer, however, there is always the risk that a given audience member might become so completely absorbed in their appreciation that they will begin to mindlessly follow the movements of the dance. A true appreciation of the dance, however, is held to be one that requires mindful reflection, not mindless immersion. Such modes of appreciation require the simultaneous enactment of unreflective moral modes of existence and the occasional rupture of such modalities as audience members are called to reawaken a heightened reflexive ethical stance on their participation. Such intersubjectively mediated shifts in attending to one's self-experience are realized, in Husserlian terms, through particular acts of phenomenological modification in which individuals are able to move between more tacit taken-for-granted orientations to the experience of appreciating the performance to more reflective and at times theoretical attitudes toward it.

The dancers, like audience members, have to work toward the achievement of a balance between unity and distinctiveness. On the one hand, they are encouraged to

cultivate a mindful concentration that creates the expressive opacity required to conceal their feelings, emotions, and thoughts from spectators. This stems from their abilities to master the movements of their bodies in harmony with the movements of the other dancers. And yet, on the other hand, concentration is expected to be such that the dancers do not focus upon their selves as isolated entities, their own performance as distinct from the others participating in the dance, or the ways in which others might be appreciating and evaluating their abilities. Indeed, this form of exaggerated self-consciousness is both morally and aesthetically derided as self-centered, egotistical, prideful, and arrogant. These shifts in the focus of attention are similarly rooted in particular acts of phenomenological modification that re-orient the dancers to morally and aesthetically appropriate modes of experiencing the activity of dancing and their performance.

CONCLUSION

In this paper I have argued that the aesthetically mediated practice, performance, and appreciation of Yapese dancing can be productively understood as a way of engendering particular orientations to experience for both dancers and audience members alike that are linked to moral and ethical modalities of being. More specifically, I have attempted to illustrate how it is that moral sensibilities entailed in the virtue of self-governance are inscribed in those aesthetic and evaluative stances that are brought to bear in the practice and appreciation of dancers, and their audiences, in the context of a dance performance. In so doing, I have worked to demonstrate how such sensibilities are dynamically realized through particular shifts in individuals' phenomenological orientations to their experience of appreciating and performing the dance. In moving from modes of unreflective practical engagement to modes of heightened self-vigilance and self-reflection participants engage in particular acts of phenomenological modification that have both important aesthetic and moral entailments.

In the context of a dance performance both audience members and performers work to cultivate an expressive opacity through disciplining their bodies and minds, subsuming their personal desires and momentary feelings in an attempt to align with the collective subjective and performative orientations of the other participants. In the process of rarifying their emotions through channeling them into such communal activities, however, there are also opportunities for participants to stand out, to be noticed as individuals - individuals who are able to approximate the ideal of virtuous self-governance. And it is in the collective monitoring and appreciation of other participants abilities to actualize these virtues in the real-time enactment of a dance performance that serves as a means to further train and attune each participants' own capacities for maintaining appropriate forms of self-reflexivity that are deemed central to enabling self-governance over their modes of expression; a capacity that extends well beyond the sphere of dancing in Yapese communities.

NOTES

1. The article is based upon 15 non-consecutive months of research on morality, pain, and suffering on Yap (September 2000, July-August 2001, September 2002-September 2003, and August 2005). The research was generously funded through UCLA's Department of Anthropology and the Social Science Research Council and Andrew W. Mellow Foundation's International Dissertation Field Research Fellowship Program. While my primary research project was devoted to exploring the experiences of chronic and acute pain sufferers on the island, my more general interests in the body, morality, and suffering quickly brought my attention to dancing as a key site for the expression and cultivation of core cultural virtues. As a result throughout my time in Yap I video-taped a number of dance performances, interviewed a number of elders who were renowned for their skills in teaching dance, and engaged in numerous informal discussions with individuals who participated in dances both as dancers and audience members. I would like to respectfully acknowledge the Council of Pilung and the Yap State Historic Preservation Office (HPO) for all of their help and for

granting me permission to conduct the project from which the data for this article were drawn. In particular, I would like to single out HPO's former director Al Fanechigiy, current director James Lukan, and staff member Peter Tun for providing me with much needed guidance throughout my time in Yap. I am very grateful to Leo Pugram at the Yap State Department of Education, as well as to my two extremely knowledgeable and gifted language teachers Francisca Mochen and Charles Taman Kamnaanged, for sharing their linguistic expertise and their knowledge of Yapese grammar. I am also indebted beyond words to my two research assistants: Sheri Manna and Stella Tiningin. Thanks to Alessandro Duranti, Linda Garro, Douglas Hollan, Allen Johnson, Cheryl Mattingly, Jill Mitchell, Keith Murphy, Angela Nonaka, and Elinor Ochs for reading over and commenting on earlier versions of this paper. Thanks also to Jim Egan and Sherwood Lingenfelter for sharing their many insights into Yapese culture and for all of their support and encouragement over the years. Finally, I would like to especially thank the people of Yap for so generously accepting me into their lives and for sharing their cares, concerns, and understandings of what it means to lead a life the Yapese way. *Siroew ngoomeed ma karimagaergad*! Of course, any mistakes, omissions, or errors in this piece are the sole responsibility of the author.

2. While it has often been the case that Western philosophers since the 1800s have sought to make a rather strict distinction between aesthetic and moral forms of judgment, it is interesting that when we turn back to early Greek philosophy that there is much overlap between notions of the beautiful and the good. For instance, the Greek term *to kalon*, which is often translated as 'beauty,' did not, however, 'refer to a thing's autonomous aesthetic value, but rather to its excellence, which is connected with its moral worth and/or usefulness' (Feagin 1995: 66). Moreover, for Aristotle, virtues (*aretai*) were themselves conceived as traits, capacities, and dispositions (e.g., justice, courage, temperance, generosity, intelligence, wisdom etc.) that bring about happiness or 'flourishing' (*eudaemon*) on account of their relative 'refinement, beauty, or excellence' (*kalos*) (see Aristotle 1985).
3. The elaboration of Husserl's notion of acts of phenomenological modification as developed in this article and elsewhere (Throop 2008a, forthcoming a and b) has been worked out in collaboration with Alessandro Duranti with whom I have co-taught the Meta-Epistemology and the Culture of Intersubjectivity seminars at UCLA. While I have been working for some time now to explore the potential contribution of Husserlian phenomenology for anthropology (see Throop 2003b, 2005; Throop and Murphy 2002) it was Duranti who first brought my attention to the significance of this particular notion for Husserl. Since that time the two of us have been working collaboratively to explore its significance for anthropological research and theorizing (see Duranti n.d. (a) and (b); Throop 2008a, forthcoming (a) and (b)). Duranti's own longstanding interest in Husserl is perhaps first evident most explicitly in his work on intentionality and truth (Duranti 1993).
4. This moral orientation strongly resonates with Mageo's characterization of Samoa, where she claims that the virtues of personal restraint (*lototele*), the effacement of personal concerns (*lotomama*) and personal abasement (*lotofa'amaualalo*) serve to canalize awareness and action toward an ideal of an other-directed, role-conscious individual that 'is not overcome by the exigencies of inner sentiments, retaining always a calm demeanor and encouraging others to do the same' (1998: 55).
5. As Charles Sanders Peirce (1992a [1878]: 132) explained in 'How to Make our Ideas Clear,' pragmatism (or what he later referred to as pragmaticism) should 'Consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conceptions to have. Then, our conception of those effects is the whole of our conception of the object.' William James similarly argued in (1995 [1907]: 18) 'What Pragmatism Means,' 'To attain perfect clearness in our thoughts of an object, then, we need only consider what conceivable effects of a practical kind the object may involve - what sensations we are to expect from it and what reactions we must prepare. Our conception of these effects, whether immediate or remote, is then for us the whole conception of the object, so far as that conception has positive significance at all.'
6. Jensen (1977a) provides different phonological renderings for 'garbage heap' (*dooq*), 'garbage, trash, rubbish' (*dow*) and body (*doow*). Given the prevalence for dialectical variations in the pronunciation of a great many Yapese terms I am not at all certain that these particular phonological and semantic ascriptions are definitive. Moreover, the fact that a number of individuals living in differing municipalities independently pointed out the connection between the term for 'trash' and the term for 'body,' suggests to me, that even regardless of the accuracy of these local etymologies, there was at the very least a strong culturally elaborated conceptual association between these two terms.
7. Of the different types of dance, men performed by far the majority of the standing dances. Indeed, during my fieldwork there was a women's standing dance that was performed by the women of Rull municipality, in response to which a number of different individuals commented that this was a very 'rare' occurrence. Some individuals suggested to me that this particular dance was said to be one of the few women's standing dances still in existence.
8. The following description of these various stages is based directly upon Noritake's (n.d.) observations.
9. As one reviewer noted, there are some very interesting comparisons to be made here with dancing in Tonga (and elsewhere in the Pacific) where the careful coordination of movements is meant to discourage individual variation (see Kaeppler 1993).
10. In recounting his own recollections of learning to dance, another friend asserted that the old man who had first taught him how to dance had emphasized that the only way to become a good dancer was to concentrate solely on the dance and nothing more. The moment that dancers begin to let their minds wander beyond the dance, he explained, they will likely start thinking of the audience watching them or comparing their performance to the person dancing beside them. To avoid these pitfalls, the old man instructed my friend to imagine his teacher watching and critiquing him while he was dancing. He pointed out that by imagining his teacher watching his every step he was constantly reminded to be humble (*soobuutaen'*) since he was dancing as if there was always someone more knowledgeable watching, observing and critiquing his performance. And it was precisely this humility, he believed, that allowed him to become a better dancer.
11. A prevalent Yapese saying emphasizing the significance of concentration and focused attention is *maenigil ma od* (it is good that he or she wakes up).

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